this is a shoddily-done 1.5 pages of study notes on the significance of social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory by robert w. cox (york university) ... all page numbers are references to chapter eight of keohane's neorealism and its critics
i am sharing it with the canadian blogging community to show you that cancon can be innovative. poli sci students can use it to cheat, if they want to get a c+.
in this article, first printed in millennium and subsequently widely cited and reproduced in several anthologies, cox advances a claim that encapsulates critical theory's epistemological underpinnings and contribution to the field of IR: "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" (207). cox presents three challenges to previously established theories of IR. firstly, he appreciates the holistic intent behind both neorealism (waltz) and world systems theory (wallerstein), but warns against "reifying" conclusions which may detract from true formulation of a holistic approach (206). secondly, the state and social forces ought to be considered jointly in order to understand the trajectory created by historical processes (206). finally, he argues for an empirical-historical methodology that accomodates and explains change more effectively than neorealism's ahistorical positivism (207).
all theories derive from a perspective which determines their purpose. by that i mean all theories are coloured by the time, place, and culture which produced them. cox identifies two strains of theorizing. the first, problem-solving theory, employs the existing theoretical framework and political conditions in order to isolate and address issues. conversely, critical theory is reflective, rejecting the "false premise" of a fixed social and political order, which cox asserts is a "convenience of method" that constitutes an ideological bias in favour of the status quo (209). if the purpose of political and social inquiry is indeed to effect change, critical theory is best suited towards that mandate, as a "guide to strategic action" cognizant of the history and ideology which inevitably impacts theory. problem-solving theory restricts the theorist into (perhaps inadvertently) perpetuating the status quo. that being said, cox acknowledges (in accordance with his belief that theory belongs to its historical climate) that there can be a time and place for problem-solving theory.
cox then evaluates marxism and realism as the foundations of the critical approach. early realists, such as meincke, carr, and dehio are credited with providing historical orientation in their work; a project abandoned by american realists morgenthau and waltz, who pushed the paradigm towards value-neutral, ahistorical problem-solving theory (211). the historical materialist approach of gramsci, hobsbawm, and the annales is the "foremost source" of critical theory, introducing:
a) dialectics - to discern the potential for change
b) imperialism - as vertical dimension of power in addition to the state-centric horizontal conception of power as a bumper cars situation between states
c) the relationship between state and civil society as "constituent entities of a world order" (214)
d) mode of production and its ramifications for power (216)
He then states the five purposes of critical theory:
1. Action is never absolutely free but takes place within a framework
for action with constitutes its problematic
2. Not only action but also theory is shaped by the problematic
3. The framework for action changes over time and a principal goal of
critical theory is to understand these changes
4. The framework has the form of an historical structure
5. The framework … is to be viewed from the bottom or from the outside
in terms of the conflicts which arise within it and open the possibility of its
transformation
(216-218)
having outlined his theoretical perspective, cox explicates the role
of historical structure in the formation of world orders, paying particular
attention to hegemony. a structure is
defined by its potentials in the form of material capabilities
(technological, organizational, and natural resources) and ideas
(historically conditioned intersubjective meanings and conflicting collective
images of social order) (218). institutionalization,
which reflects and entrenches the power relations evident when particular
institutions arose, is linked to the gramscian concept of hegemony (219). in a hegemonic structure, the dominant
interests secure power by co-opting the weak as they “express their leadership
in terms of universal or general interests” (219). these processes are not static; rather, they are limited
totalities of a particular time and space which contain the dialectic
possibility of change; that is, social forces, forms of state, and world orders
can all be represented as a series of “dominant and emergent rival structures”
(220). social forces, hegemony, and
imperialism interact as states mediate global and local social forces,
establishing the political economy perspective in which “power emerg[es]
from social forces” and ideas, institutions and material capabilities are
assessed on these three levels (225-226).
cox then discusses the internationalization of the state as “fragments
of states” evolved to become the primary units of interaction (231). in developed states this represents the
ascendancy of state ministries as independent actors, while in the periphery
the power rests with international organizations (232-233). international production is engendering a global
class structure which co-exists with national class structures, led by the transnational
managerial class. workers have also
been fragmented into non-established and established, working
respectively in international and national production, creating problems for
social cohesion (235).
future world order prospects are presented in three hypothetical
situations based on configurations of social forces with varying implications
for the state system (237). firstly,
there is the possibility of a new hegemony based on internationalized
production, suggesting a continued primacy of international capital and
interests in both the core and the periphery (237). conversely, “a non-hegemonic world structure of conflicting power
centers” may emerge if neo-mercantilism rises in the core, creating a
climate of cooperation with a particular core state for each periphery country
(238). finally, cox does not rule out
the possibility of a counter-hegemony based in the periphery, resulting
in the “termination of the core-periphery relationship” which is entirely
contingent on increased development in the periphery (239).
cox’s strength lies primarily in his thorough assessment of
historical examples without downplaying the role of history as neorealists do
with their picking historical facts out of a quarry approach. moreover,
his re-orientation and reframing of international relations theory as a
normative, emancipatory exercise establishes the discipline as a source of
progress, rather than a cottage industry justifying the status quo. critical theory emphasizes the political
aspect of political science, reminding students and observers that each
theorist (or diplomat) must contend with their own personal and cultural
prejudices as human observers of politics cannot divorce themselves from their
subject matter. ultimately, critical
theory’s value rests with its reflexivity and hope for progress.
